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1 Structure
In this Online Appendix, we conduct additional analysis of the data and robustness checks
as well as provide some theoretical analysis. We proceed as follows. At the end of Section
1, we describe the type of statistical analysis we perform to compare treatments and be-
haviors in different parts of the experiment. This section also contains definitions we use
in the Online Appendix. In Section 2, we present additional analysis of the Pure Com-
munication treatment. In Section 3, we present additional analysis of the Communication
and Transfers treatment. In Section 4, we consider the choice of “small perturbation” that
was fixed at two experimental units for the results reported in the paper. We show the
robustness of our results to alternative levels of perturbation. In Section 5, we illustrate
that the risk measure elicited in some sessions does not seem to explain subjects’ behavior
either during communication or while bidding. In Section 6, we discuss learning effects
and compare outcomes and behavior in the first and second halves of the experiment. In
Section 7, we present analysis of additional experimental sessions that we conducted with
complete strangers matching protocol. Finally, in Section 8, we provide some theoretical
analysis of one-shot independent private value sealed-bid auctions corresponding to our
different treatments.
Our Statistical Analysis
To compare average outcomes between two groups (be that two treatments, two auctions,
or two parts of the experiment), we use regression analysis. More precisely, we run a
random-effects GLS regression in which we regress the variable of interest, e.g. an indi-
cator of whether an outcome is efficient or collusive, or observed price, on a constant and
an indicator for one of the two considered groups. We cluster standard errors by session.
We report that there is a statistically significant difference between outcomes in these two
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groups if the estimated coefficient on the group indicator is significantly different from zero
at the 5% level.
To compare median outcomes between two groups, we use the Wilcoxon rank-sum test
and report results at the 5% significance level. To compare two distributions (for example,
the distribution of prices or the distribution of reported values) we use the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test and report results at the 5% significance level.
Definitions
As discussed in the main text of the paper, we allow for perturbations of two experimental
points in our classifications of outcomes. Below is the list of definitions we use in our
analysis (both in the main text of the paper and in this Online Appendix):
• We call an outcome efficient if the winning bidder’s value was at least as high as the
losing bidder’s value minus two experimental points.
• We use the term minimal price to refer to a price less or equal to two experimental
points.
• When we discuss collusion rates, we say an outcome is collusive if the auction
culminates in a minimal price (price below or equal to two experimental points).
• We use the expression substantial transfer to refer to a transfer of more than two
experimental points.
• When analyzing communication between bidders, we distinguish between the follow-
ing three categories of reports regarding bidders’ values and bids. In cases in which a
numerical value was reported, we say that a bidder understates her true value (bid)
if her announced value (bid) is below her true value (bid) minus two experimental
points. We say that a bidder overstates her true value (bid) if she reports a value
higher than her true value plus two experimental points. Otherwise, we say that the
bidder reports her value (bid) truthfully.
2 Pure Communication Treatment
In the main text of the paper, we have documented that our experimental subjects in the
Pure Communication treatments often choose not to discuss their values and bids with
each other. Figure 1 depicts the distribution of announced values and bids as a function
of actual values and bids in the minority of cases in which subjects chose to report their
values and/or bids in rounds 6 to 10. The size of each point in this figure is a proxy for
the corresponding number of observations. As evident from Figure 1, the most common
pattern of misrepresentation of values in both auction formats is an understatement of
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the true value. With respect to bids, much of the truthful revelation is linked with fairly
low bids, as is much of the misrepresentation. The extensive amount of lying coupled
with the low frequency of reporting values and bids explains why subjects in our Pure
Communication treatments achieved a rather limited volume of collusive outcomes.
Figure 1: Misrepresentation Patterns in Pure Communication Treatments
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Next, we inspect whether conversations that preceded the bidding stage in the Pure Com-
munication treatment affect outcomes in terms of efficiency and the auctioneer’s revenues
(or prices). Instead of looking at individual communication strategies, here we consider the
conversation as a whole and count each conversation as a unit of observation. In particu-
lar, a conversation is classified as “relevant” if at least one of the bidders sent a message
about values, bids, or strategy. The remaining conversations are classified as “irrelevant.”
Most irrelevant conversations contained greeting messages such as “hi,” “how are you doing
there?,” or some other short message having nothing to do with the experiment.
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Table 1: Frequencies of Conversations in the Pure Communication Treatment
First-price Auctions Second-price Auctions
rounds 1 to 5 rounds 6 to 10 rounds 1 to 5 rounds 6 to 10
No Conversation 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.51
Irrelevant Conversations 0.21 0.19 0.27 0.13
Relevant Conversations 0.38 0.46 0.43 0.36
Table 2: Efficiency Depending on Conversations in the Pure Communication Treatment
First-price Auctions Second-price Auctions
rounds 1 to 5 rounds 6 to 10 rounds 1 to 5 rounds 6 to 10
No Conversation 0.92 0.93 0.78 0.81
Irrelevant Conversations 0.96 0.90 0.86 0.68
Relevant Conversations 0.66 0.75 0.75 0.78
Table 1 depicts the frequencies of relevant conversations in each auction format both in the
first half and the second half of the experiment. Table 2 lists the corresponding efficiency
levels in each of these categories. Regression analysis reveals that bidders who discuss rele-
vant topics (values, bids, or strategies) in our first-price auction with pure communication
achieve significantly lower efficiency levels than those that do not talk at all or discuss
irrelevant topics (p < 0.01 in rounds 1 to 5 and p = 0.003 in rounds 6 to 10). This result
combined with the excessive lying about values and bids documented in the paper suggests
that bidders often do not trust their opponents’ announcement. This has a statistically sig-
nificant detrimental effect on overall efficiency. There is no such effect in our second-price
auctions, in which in the last 5 rounds of the experiment, more than 50% of groups do not
talk.
Finally, we study the effects of relevant conversations on the prices that emerge in both
auction formats. Figures 2 and 3 present price distributions in our first- and second-price
auctions with pure communication broken down into the three categories: pairs that dis-
cussed relevant topics, pairs that discussed irrelevant topics, and pairs that chose not to
talk with one another. In both auction formats and throughout the experiment, there
is no statistically significant difference between prices in auctions in which bidders chose
not to communicate with one another and auctions in which bidders discussed irrelevant
topics (p > 0.05 in all regressions). However, we observe lower prices in auctions in which
bidders discussed relevant matters compared with auctions in which bidders either did not
communicate or discussed irrelevant topics (p < 0.01 in all regressions).
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Figure 2: The Effect of Relevant Conversations on Prices in First-price Auctions
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Figure 3: The Effect of Relevant Conversations on Prices in Second-price Auctions
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Table 3: Collusive Rates and Substantial Transfers in the Last Round, by Session
Collusive Rates Substantial Transfers Rates
all auctions minimal price
first-price second-price first-price second-price first-price second-price
all sessions 0.76 0.86 0.67 0.66 0.84 0.71
session 1 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.60 1.00 0.75
session 2 0.67 0.67 0.50 0.33 0.75 0.50
session 3 0.83 1.00 0.67 0.50 0.80 0.50
session 4 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.80
session 5 0.40 0.80 0.40 1.00 0.50 1.00
session 6 0.80 1.00 0.60 0.80 0.75 0.80
3 Communication and Transfers Treatment
In this section we report additional statistical analysis of the Communication and Transfers
treatment. We start by showing that even in the very last round of sessions subjects suc-
cessfully achieved collusive outcomes. In our second-price auctions, the last round of each
session was round 10. In our first-price auctions, the last round of sessions 2, 4, 5, and 6 was
round 10, while the last round of session 1 was round 11 and the last round of session 3 was
round 12. Table 3 reports collusion rates and how often we observe substantial transfers in
the very last round of each session.
Next, we observe that some pairs of bidders agreed on exact amounts to be transferred
from the winning bidder to the losing bidder while other pairs decided to split the surplus.
Figure 4 depicts how often these two types of agreements occurred in each of the auction
formats by round. In both auction formats, as subjects experience the game, they learn
to discuss transfers more often. In our first-price auctions, we detect higher frequencies
of exact agreements in later rounds as compared with earlier rounds (p < 0.05). In our
second-price auctions, the fraction of exact agreements is stable throughout the experiment
(p > 0.10).
Table 4 summarizes the average amount of transfers when breaking the data by the type
of agreement reached in the communication stage and the ultimate price. In both auction
formats and throughout the experiment, transfers are significantly higher when winning
bidders obtain the object at a minimal price than at a strictly higher than minimal price
(p < 0.05). Related to this point, Figure 5 depicts the fraction of winners per round who
transfer nothing to the losing bidder after receiving the object at a minimal price. This
fraction is quite stable across rounds in both our first- and second-price auctions. This
indicates that a majority of winning bidders continue to share the surplus with their coun-
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Figure 4: Frequency of Bidders Agreeing on Transfers
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terparts even after gaining a lot of experience.
Figures 6 and 7 present transfers as shares of surplus captured by winning bidders for all
auctions and for auctions in which the object’s price was zero. Figure 7 shows that the
most common behav r of win ing bidders is to share equally the surplus captured with
the losing bidder when the price is very low.
Finally, Table 5 reports results from a Probit regression in which whether or not substantial
transfers were passed is regressed on the winning bidder’s surplus and other control vari-
ables, in analogy to Table 4 in the main text of the paper. The results reported in Table 5
have similar implications as those reported in Table 4 in the main text of the paper. Most
importantly, the winning bidder’s surplus has a statistically significant impact on whether
transfers occur.
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Table 4: Average Transfers and Agreements Reached During Communication
First-price Auctions Second-price Auctions
rounds 1 to 5 rounds 6 to 10 rounds 1 to 5 rounds 6 to 10
mean # of obs mean # of obs mean # of obs mean # of obs
Transfers are Not Discussed 2.88 60 2.49 31 5.74 68 6.40 34
Agreed on Exact Transfers
minimal price 26.97 35 25.30 57 20.07 35 23.85 36
price higher than minimal 6.40 5 0.00 8 0.00 4 0.00 5
Agreed to Split Surplus
minimal price 28.13 49 27.47 57 26.40 47 21.82 79
price higher than minimal 6.34 16 4.46 12 5.36 6 7.50 6
Notes: Minimal price is less or equal to two experimental units.
Figure 5: Fraction of Winning Bidders that Transfer Nothing to Losing Bidders
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Figure 6: Transfers as Shares of Winning Bidders’ Surplus
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Figure 7: Transfers as Shares of Winning Bidders’ Surplus when the Price is Minimal
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Table 5: Probit Estimates Explaining when Transfers Occur
First-price Second-price
Winning Bidder’s Surplus 0.03∗∗ (0.003) 0.02∗∗ (0.007)
Losing Bidder’s Value -0.01∗∗ (0.003) -0.01 (0.007)
Indicator if Efficient Outcome 0.80∗ (0.48) 0.33 (0.31)
Indicator if Winning Bidder Lied in the Past about Values or Bids -0.50∗∗ (0.21) -0.70∗∗ (0.27)
Constant -1.19∗∗ (0.36) -0.27 (0.40)
# of obs 165 160
# of sessions 6 6
Pseudo R-square 0.3415 0.3162
Remarks: Estimates are from the Probit regressions with a dependent variable that takes the value of 1 if
the winning bidder transferred a substantial amount (more than 2 experimental points) to the losing bidder
and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are clustered at the session level. ∗∗ (∗) indicates significance
at the 5% (10%) level.
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Table 6: Frequency of Efficient Outcomes when Small Perturbation is One Experimental
Point
First-price Auctions Second-price Auctions
rounds 1 to 5 rounds 6 to 10 rounds 1 to 5 rounds 6 to 10
No Communication 0.89 (0.02) 0.88 (0.03) 0.81 (0.03) 0.79 (0.03)
Pure Communication 0.80 (0.04) 0.84 (0.04) 0.78 (0.04) 0.78 (0.05)
Comm with Transfers 0.83 (0.03) 0.86 (0.04) 0.84 (0.03) 0.84 (0.04)
Notes: In the parentheses we report robust standard errors clustered by session. An outcome is considered
efficient if the winning bidder’s value is greater or equal to the losing bider’s value minus 1 experimental
point.
Table 7: Collusion Rates when Small Perturbation is One Experimental Point
First-price Auctions Second-price Auctions
rounds 1 to 5 rounds 6 to 10 rounds 1 to 5 rounds 6 to 10
No Communication 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.02 (0.001) 0.02 (0.01)
Pure Communication 0.08 (0.03) 0.06 (0.02) 0.17 (0.06) 0.23 (0.09)
Comm with Transfers 0.44 (0.06) 0.65 (0.08) 0.58 (0.03) 0.80 (0.05)
Notes: In the parenthesis we report robust standard errors clustered by session.
4 Choice of “Small” Perturbation
In the analysis of our experimental data we allowed for a small perturbation in mea-
surements that we set at two experimental points. The choice of this small perturbation
is somewhat arbitrary and intended to account for small errors and rounding. We now
demonstrate that if we change our threshold to one experimental point, results remain
virtually identical. In particular, in Table 6 we report the frequency of efficient outcomes
when the small perturbation is taken to be one, while in Table 7 we report the frequency
of collusive outcomes when the small perturbation is, again, taken to be one experimental
point.
5 Risk Attitudes
In this section we investigate whether the risk measure that we elicited in several sessions
correlates with subjects’ bidding behavior and the, tendency to discuss relevant topics dur-
ing the communication phase. Recall that for half of sessions in each treatment, at the
end of the session we asked subjects to allocate 100 points (translating into $2) between
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a safe investment, which had a unit return (i.e., returning point for point), and a risky
investment, which with probability 50% returned 2.5 points for each point invested and
with probability 50% produced no returns for the investment.
In Table 8 we report the results of the regression analysis in which we regress bids submit-
ted in our sessions without communication on bidders’ values and different measures of risk
attitudes. In both the first- and the second-price auctions without communication, we find
that risk attitude of subjects does not play a statistically significant role in determining
bidding strategies.
Table 9 reports p-values corresponding to the pairwise correlations between announcing
one’s value or bid and various risk measures in the treatment with pure communication.
We find that risk attitude as measured by CRRA and CARA coefficients has some effect
on the tendency of subjects to announce their values or intended bids in the first-price but
not in the second-price auctions.
Finally, Table 10 summarizes results from our regression analysis, in which we investigate
the relationship between risk attitudes and bidding strategies in pure communication treat-
ment. We present regressions for all auctions that occurred in rounds 6 to 10 irrespective
of whether or not any form of conversation occurred prior to the auction. Regressions that
focus only on auctions in which there was no conversation at all produce very similar results
and are available from the authors upon request. The resulting estimates clearly indicate
that elicited risk attitudes have no statistically significant impact on subjects’ bidding be-
havior.
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Table 8: Relationship between Risk Attitudes and Bidding Strategies in the No Commu-
nication treatment, rounds 6 to 10
First-price Auctions
regression 1 regression 2 regression 3 regression 4
Bidder’s Value 0.77** (0.03) 0.77** (0.03) 0.77** (0.03) 0.77** (0.03)
Risky Investment -0.06 (0.05)
Risk-averse 2.42 (3.42)
β from CARA 1519.36 (1224.04)
ρ from CRRA 13.99 (11.38)
Constant 5.19 (3.76) -0.51 (3.32) -3.91 (4.95) -3.48 (4.67)
# of observations 150 150 120 120
# of clusters 30 30 24 24
Log Likelihood -555.00 -555.39 -453.12 -453.13
Second-price Auctions
regression 1 regression 2 regression 3 regression 4
Bidder’s Value 0.83** (0.06) 0.83** (0.06) 0.79** (0.07) 0.79** (0.07)
Risky Investment 0.02 (0.10)
Risk-averse -1.02 (6.25)
β from CARA 462.75 (301.59)
ρ from CRRA 4.51 (2.99)
Constant 21.27** (7.60) 23.27** (5.92) 21.58** (5.17) 21.68** (5.17)
# of observations 150 150 105 105
# of clusters 30 30 21 21
Log Likelihood -578.92 -578.92 -411.72 -411.76
Notes: Random-effects TOBIT regressions. The dependent variable is Observed Bid. Standard errors are
clustered by subject. Risky investment stands for the number of tokens invested in the risky project in the
Investment Task (a number between 0 and 100). Risk-averse is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the
subject invested a strictly less than 100 tokens, which indicates that she is risk-averse. β is the estimated
parameter from the CARA utility function u(x) = 1− e−βx. ρ is the estimated parameter from the CRRA
utility function u(x) = x
1−ρ
1−ρ . ** indicates significance at the 5% level. The number of observations in
regressions 3 and 4 is smaller than in regressions 1 and 2 since we can estimate parameters β and ρ only
for subjects who chose a risky investment strictly greater than 0 and lower than 100.
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Table 9: Correlations between Tendency to Announce Values and Bids and Risk Measures
First-price Auctions
Pure Communication, rounds 6 to 10
risky investment risk-averse β from CARA ρ from CRRA
Indicator for Announcing Value 0.1008 -0.0692 0.3932∗∗ 0.3902∗∗
Indicator for Announcing Bid -0.1298 0.0537 0.4633∗∗ 0.4646∗∗
Second-price Auctions
Pure Communication, rounds 6 to 10
risky investment risk-averse β from CARA ρ from CRRA
Indicator for Announcing Value 0.0702 0.0713 0.1613 0.1988
Indicator for Announcing Bid 0.1132 0.0473 0.2071 0.1984
Notes: We report correlation scores corresponding to the pairwise correlations between dummy variables
that indicate whether a subject announced his or her value or bid and different measures of risk attitudes.
∗∗ indicates that correlation is significant at the standard 5% level. Risky investment stands for the number
of tokens invested in the risky project in the Investment Task (a number between 0 and 100). We exclude
5 subjects who reported that they want to invest 0 tokens in the risky project. Risk-averse is an indicator
that takes the value 1 if the subject invested a strictly less than 100 tokens, which indicates that she is
risk-averse. β is the estimated parameter from the CARA utility function u(x) = 1 − e−βx. ρ is the
estimated parameter from the CRRA utility function u(x) = x
1−ρ
1−ρ .
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Table 10: Relationship between Risk Attitudes and Bidding Strategies in the Pure Com-
munication Treatment, round 6 to 10
First-price Auctions
regression 1 regression 2 regression 3 regression 4
Bidder’s Value 0.54** (0.04) 0.54** (0.04) 0.50** (0.05) 0.50** (0.05)
Risky Investment 0.02 (0.08)
Risk-averse 1.54 (4.32)
β from CARA -2650.95 (1591.80)
ρ from CRRA -25.40 (15.14)
Constant -4.44 (6.38) -4.15 (3.98) 8.97 (6.82) 8.55 (6.58)
# of obs 170 170 105 105
# of subjects 34 34 21 21
Log Likelihood -667.09 -667.05 -415.54 -415.52
Second-price Auctions
regression 1 regression 2 regression 3 regression 4
Bidder’s Value 0.67** (0.08) 0.68** (0.08) 0.83** (0.13) 0.83** (0.13) (3.02) (0.12)
Risky Investment -0.04 (0.12)
Risk-averse 20.10** (8.75)
β from CARA -7737 (5235.81)
ρ from CRRA -78.11 (43.06)
Constant 7.49 (9.70) -8.78 (8.35) 30.02 (17.69) 29.10** (14.67)
# of obs 150 150 75 75
# of subjects 30 30 15 15
Log Likelihood -645.96 -643.55 -308.27 -307.80
Notes: Random-effects TOBIT regressions. The dependent variable is Observed Bid. Standard errors are
clustered by subject. Risky investment stands for the number of tokens invested in the risky project in the
Investment Task (a number between 0 and 100). Risk-averse is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the
subject invested a strictly less than 100 tokens, which indicates that she is risk-averse. β is the estimated
parameter from the CARA utility function u(x) = 1− e−βx. ρ is the estimated parameter from the CRRA
utility function u(x) = x
1−ρ
1−ρ . ** indicates significance at the 5% level. The number of observations in
regressions 3 and 4 is smaller than in regressions 1 and 2 since we can estimate parameters β and ρ only
for subjects who chose a risky investment strictly greater than 0 and lower than 100.
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Table 11: Efficiency Levels, by Treatment
First-price Auctions Second-price Auctions
rounds 1 to 5 rounds 6 to 10 rounds 1 to 5 rounds 6 to 10
No Communication 0.91 (0.02) 0.89 (0.03) 0.81 (0.03) 0.80 (0.03)
Pure Communication 0.80 (0.04) 0.84 (0.04) 0.79 (0.04) 0.78 (0.05)
Comm with Transfers 0.83 (0.03) 0.87 (0.03) 0.84 (0.03) 0.84 (0.04)
Notes: In the parentheses we report robust standard errors clustered by session.
6 Learning
In this section we compare outcomes observed in the first five and second five rounds of
our experimental sessions in terms of efficiency, collusion, and ultimate prices.
Table 11 reports efficiency levels by treatment. Efficiency levels are stable across the two
parts of the experiment: rounds 1 to 5 and rounds 6 to 10. Regression analysis confirms
this observation: we detect no statistically significant differences between efficiency levels
in the first five and the ensuing five rounds of the experiment in any of our treatments
(p > 0.05 in all six regressions).
Table 12 reports frequencies of collusive outcomes in each treatment and each auction for-
mat. Table 13 lists p-values from pairwise comparisons between frequencies of collusion in
the two parts of the experiment for each treatment and auction format. As evident from
these tables, there are very few collusive outcomes in treatments without communication
or treatments with pure communication in both auction formats. At the same time, both
in the first and in the second half of the experiment, collusive outcomes are frequent when
bidders can communicate and use transfers. Moreover, collusion becomes significantly more
frequent in later rounds in the treatment allowing for communication and transfers, under
both auction formats.
Table 14 presents summary statistics of observed prices in our first- and second-price auc-
tions in both parts of the experiment. This table also compares average observed prices
between the first and the second part of the experiment, for each treatment separately. In
our first-price auctions without communication or with pure communication, we detect no
statistically significant difference in average prices in the two parts of the experiment. On
the contrary, in the first-price auctions with communication and transfers average prices
in the second part of the experiment are significantly lower than in the first part. In con-
trast, we observe a statistically significant increase in prices as subjects gain experience in
our second-price auctions without communication, no statistically significant difference be-
16
Table 12: Frequency of Collusive Outcomes, by Treatment
First-price Auctions Second-price Auctions
rounds 1 to 5 rounds 6 to 10 rounds 1 to 5 rounds 6 to 10
No Communication 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.03 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Pure Communication 0.10 (0.03) 0.14 (0.06) 0.18 (0.06) 0.23 (0.09)
Comm with Transfers 0.52 (0.08) 0.71 (0.06) 0.59 (0.04) 0.79 (0.05)
Notes: In the parentheses we report robust standard errors clustered by session.
Table 13: Regressions Comparing the Frequency of Collusive Outcomes Throughout Ses-
sions
First-price Auctions Second-price Auctions
No Communication 0.672
Pure Communication 0.204 0.333
Comm with Transfers 0.000 0.000
Notes: We report p-values that correspond to the estimated coefficient of a dummy that takes the value
of 1 if the auction took place in the second part of the experiment (rounds 6 to 10). All regressions are
random-effect GLS regressions, with standard errors clustered at the session level.
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Table 14: Prices, by Treatment
First-price Auctions
test of average prices
rounds 1 to 5 rounds 6 to 10 b/w earlier and later rounds
mean (st err) median mean (st err) median p-value
No Communication 53.69 (3.3) 50.00 50.15 (3.1) 50.00 0.180
Pure Communication 38.41 (3.0) 40.00 36.37 (2.2) 38.31 0.445
Comm with Transfers 20.26 (4.6) 2.00 8.75 (1.7) 0.02 0.000
Second-price Auctions
test of average prices
rounds 1 to 5 rounds 6 to 10 b/w earlier and later rounds
mean (st err) median mean (st err) median p-value
No Communication 41.86 (2.4) 40.00 48.30 (2.9) 50.00 0.035
Pure Communication 25.84 (3.0) 17.50 28.83 (4.0) 23.04 0.288
Comm with Transfers 14.47 (1.4) 1.00 8.11 (2.1) 0.00 0.007
Notes: Robust standard errors are computed by clustering observations by session. Comparison between av-
erage prices in earlier and later parts of the experiment is performed using random-effects GLS regressions,
in which standard errors are clustered at the session level.
tween earlier and later rounds in the treatment with pure communication, and statistically
significant decrease in prices in the treatment with communication and transfers.
7 Additional Sessions with Complete Strangers Pro-
tocol
We conducted several additional sessions for our Pure Communication and Communica-
tion with Transfers treatments in each auction format, in which we employed a complete
strangers protocol. Under this protocol, each subject was never paired more than once with
any other subject. While such sessions require more subjects, they allow us to eliminate
repeated game effects altogether. The only difference between these additional sessions
and the ones analyzed in the main text of the paper is the matching protocol. Table 15
below presents the number of sessions and the number of subjects participating in these
additional sessions.
Table 16 presents revenues and efficiency observed in our experimental sessions sepa-
rating out sessions that were conducted with random re-matching of participants between
rounds and those conducted with complete strangers protocol.
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Table 15: Sessions with Complete Strangers Protocol
Auction Format Available Interaction Nb of Sessions Nb of Subjects
First-price Pure Communication 3 sessions 40 subjects
Communication with Transfers 1 session 12 subjects
Second-price Pure Communication 2 sessions 28 subjects
Communication with Transfers 1 session 12 subjects
Table 16: Revenues and Efficiency, rounds 6 to 10
First-price Auctions Second-price Auctions
efficiency revenues collusion efficiency revenues collusion
Pure Communication 79% 31.08 (2.3) 16% 64% 41.04 (6.4) 3%
Comm + Transfers 80% 0.92 (0.28) 90% 77% 28.0 (6.3) 50%
Remarks: For revenues, we report average quantity as well as robust standard errors in the parenthesis
where observations are clustered at the session level in case we have more than one session.
Table 16 shows that outcomes obtained in sessions with the complete strangers matching
protocol exhibit similar patterns to those documented in the main text of the paper (using
random re-matching across rounds). In particular, the availability of transfers does not
affect efficiency levels conditional on auction format (p = 0.904 and p = 0.225 for the first-
and second-price auctions with communication with and without transfers, respectively).
Moreover, in both auction formats, the availability of transfers increases significantly the
frequency of successful collusion (p < 0.01 in both regressions). Finally, the availability
of transfers decreases the revenues of the auctioneer: this effect is highly significant in the
first-price auction with p < 0.01, and goes in the correct direction but is not significant in
the second price auction, with p = 0.271.
Finally, in the treatments with Communication and Transfers, we observe that winners
often transfer statistically significant amounts to their losing partners even when they know
that they are never going to interact with the same partner again through the experimen-
tal protocol. Positive transfers occur in 70% of our first-price auctions and in 43% of our
second-price auctions in sessions with the complete strangers protocol. The frequency of
transfers depends on how the auction culminates: transfers are very frequent if the ultimate
price is minimal (this happens in over 70% of the first-price and over 85% of the second-
price auctions). Finally, conditional on transferring a positive amount, winners transfer
on average 44% of their surplus to their losing opponent in our first-price auctions and
48% in our second-price auctions. This analysis confirms that high frequencies of transfers
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documented in our sessions are robust and are not an artifact of the fully random protocol
of matching subjects.
8 Theoretical Analysis
In our setting, absent communication, the first-price auction admits a unique equilibrium
in which each bidder submits half her valuation (see Lebrun, 2004 and Maskin and Riley,
2003). In the second-price auction, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium, which entails
strategies that are not weakly dominated, where each bidder bids precisely her value (see
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Nonetheless, in the second-price auction, there exist multiple
asymmetric equilibria (for instance, one bidder bidding 100 and the other 0, regardless
of their private values, is an equilibrium).1 It is important to note that when symmetric
equilibria are played in the first- and second-price auctions, the resulting mappings between
bidders’ valuations to allocation of the object (i.e., the probability that either bid wins the
object) coincide. Furthermore, in both auctions the bidder with a valuation of 0 expects 0
payoffs. In this case, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem applies and the first- and second-
price auctions are expected to generate identical revenues, given by 100/3.
With communication, the extant literature does not provide clear guidance on what
outcomes may emerge. One issue is that communication naturally introduces multiplic-
ity of equilibria with communication. The other, however, is that the literature has not
provided a full characterization of equilibria of independent private value first- and second-
price auctions with communication, as the ones we discuss. In terms of first-price auctions,
Lopomo, Marx, and Sun (2011) may be the closest. Their results illustrate that with two
bidders, binary valuations, and finite possible bids with vanishing increments, communica-
tion does not allow bidders to achieve greater returns than in the non-cooperative case with
no communication. Most of the literature on one-shot collusion in auctions relies on some
level of commitment across cartel members. Nonetheless, as we describe in the paper,
the underlying message—with the caveat of differing assumptions—is that private-value
sealed-bid second-price auctions are more fragile to collusion than first-price auctions.
In order to illustrate the theoretical results we can develop, let us first describe formally
the setting. Assume there are two risk-neutral bidders. Agents’ private valuations are
independently and uniformly drawn from V = [0, 100]. At the outset, each individual
knows her own value realization, but not the other bidder’s. Bids are restricted to B =
V = [0, 100].
1For three or more bidders, Blume and Heidhues (2004) characterize the full set of equilibria in second-
price auctions without communication.
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We concentrate on first- and second-price auctions in which the highest bidder receives
the good for a price corresponding to the highest and second highest bid, respectively. In
either auction format, upon a tie, the winner is randomly chosen.
In what follows, we consider the case in which a cheap-talk stage is available after agents
learn their private valuations and prior to submitting their bids. Formally, we consider the
cheap-talk extensions of the first- and second-price auctions and study the induced set of
equilibria.
From the Revelation Principle, an equilibrium with communication is tantamount to a
mapping µ : V 2 → ∆(B2) satisfying two types of incentive constraints: truthful revelation
and obedience. An equilibrium outcome is a mapping γ : V 2 → ∆ ({1, 2} × [0, 100]) , which
maps any reported value profile into a distribution over the winning bidder and the price
paid for the object. Denote by Γk the set of equilibrium outcomes corresponding to the
k-price auction with communication, k = 1, 2.
Consider first the scope of collusion. Notice that in a second-price auction with com-
munication, bidders can guarantee a price of 0, even in a symmetric equilibrium. Namely,
bidders can randomly select the winner of the auction, who then submits a bid of 100, while
the other bidder submits a bid of 0. This cannot be replicated in the first-price auction,
where a price of 0 requires both bidders to submit a bid of 0 and is subject to profitable
deviations. In fact, in the first-price auction, there cannot be any equilibrium of the game
with communication in which the price of the object is always below some p, for sufficiently
small p. Intuitively, suppose in some equilibrium the price always falls below some p > 0.
A bidder who submits a bid of p + ε for an arbitrarily small ε > 0 would then win the
object for sure. For a bidder with valuation v > p to follow the equilibrium prescriptions
instead requires that the bidder win the object with a sufficiently high probability and,
in that case, pay a price sufficiently lower than p + ε. For instance, if v − p > v/2, or
v > 2p, a bidder with a valuation of v would need to win the object with more than a 50%
probability. But, since v is distributed uniformly on [0, 100], if p < 25, more than half of
the bidders have a probability greater than 50% of winning the object, which leads to a
contradiction.2 To summarize, we have the following observation:
Observation (Full Collusion under First- and Second-price Auctions): In the first-
price auction, there is no equilibrium with communication that generates a price lower
than 100/4 = 25 regardless of the realized valuations. In the second-price auction,
there is a (symmetric) equilibrium with communication that yields a price of 0 always.
This observation suggests that full collusion, generating 0 revenue, is possible under the
second-price auction, but not under the first-price auction. The next proposition illustrates
2Lopomo, Marx, and Sun (2011) showed that when there are two bidders and two possible values
for the object, if the bid increment is sufficiently small, profitable collusion is not possible. While the
generalization of this result to our setup is beyond the scope of this paper, these observations are in line
with their conclusions.
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that, in fact, any outcome produced in the first-price auction with communication can be
emulated in the second-price auction with communication. In that respect, with communi-
cation, the scope for collusion under the second-price auction is strictly greater than that
under the first-price auction. Formally,
Proposition 1. The set of equilibrium outcomes generated by second-price auctions with
communication strictly contains all equilibrium outcomes generated by the first-price auc-
tion, Γ1 ( Γ2.
Proof. Notice that the outcomes corresponding to equilibria of the second-price auction
without communication (and any mixtures of those) remain equilibrium outcomes of the
second-price auction with communication. We now show that the outcome corresponding
to the unique equilibrium in the first-price auction can be emulated in the second-price
auction with communication. Indeed, consider the following mapping:
µ(v1, v2) =

(
100, v1
2
)
v1 > v2(
v2
2
, 100
)
v1 < v2
1
2
⊗ (100, v1
2
)
+ 1
2
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2
, 100
)
v1 = v2
,
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2
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+ 1
2
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2
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)
denotes a 50−50 mixture between the bid profile (100, v1
2
)
and the bid profile
(
v1
2
, 100
)
.
We now show that µ constitutes an equilibrium of the second-price auction with com-
munication. Notice first that it is never profitable for a bidder to deviate at the bidding
stage when told to bid an amount lower than 100. In this case, the bidder knows the other
bidder is bidding 100, and she can only win the object if she bids 100 too, in which case
her profit would be at most 0. Now, suppose bidder i deviates by reporting vˆi and bidding
bˆi ≤ 100 when told to bid 100. If bˆi < vˆi2 , she never wins the object and her expected payoff
is 0. If bˆi >
vˆi
2
, her expected payoff is:[
Pr(vj < vˆi) +
1
2
Pr(vj = vˆi)
](
vi − vˆi
2
)
=
2vivˆi − vˆ2i
200
,
which is maximized at vˆi = vi, in which case bidding bˆi >
vˆi
2
or 100 generates the same
expected payoff. If bˆi =
vˆi
2
, then the bidder receives half of the expected payoff she would
receive by bidding 100, which is not profitable.
The equilibrium µ implements the same outcome that would have been achieved in the
first-price auction without communication. The highest valuation bidder receives the good
and pays a price that is precisely half of her valuation (when valuations coincide, each
bidder gets the good with a 50− 50 chance). This completes the proof.
Intuitively, an outcome of the first-price auction can be emulated by the second-price
auction as follows. Whenever the bidders are to submit different bids, say b1 > b2 in the
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first-price auction, bidder 1 submits 100, thereby assuring she will receive the object, and
bidder 2 submits b1, thereby assuring the price is b1. When bids coincide in the first-price
auction, b1 = b2 = b, bidders can toss a fair coin in the second-price auction to determine
who will bid 100 and who will bid b, which guarantees an equal chance of winning at the
price b. In the proof we also show that this procedure assures truthful revelation.
The set of equilibrium outcomes in the second-price auction with communication is
large. Indeed, bidders can always publicly randomize during the communication phase
over which equilibrium they intend to play, assuring that the set of equilibrium outcomes
is a convex set. In particular, it contains the convex hull of the outcomes just discussed,
those generated by the equilibrium of the first-price auction, as well as the symmetric and
asymmetric equilibrium outcomes of the second-price auction (in fact, it strictly contains
the convex hull of the set of equilibrium outcomes of second-price auctions without com-
munication). The main message of the proposition is that communication has more of an
impact on second-price auctions than it does on first-price auctions.
There are two notes on this theoretical result. First, the cheap-talk extension of the
auctions we consider implicitly assumes the availability of an impartial mediator (for the
use of the Revelation Principle). The general characterization of games in which unmedi-
ated communication generates the same outcomes as mediated communication is a difficult
problem (see Gerardi, 2004 and references therein and note that Gerardi, 2004 suggests
that with five or more bidders, a mediator is unnecessary). Nonetheless, even absent a
mediator, the set of equilibrium outcomes strictly expands when communication is intro-
duced to second-price auctions (for instance, bidders can randomize between equilibria of
the auction without communication). Second, we do not preclude weakly dominated strate-
gies. This certainly simplifies the analysis, but the ultimate validity of this allowance is in
the data. As our experimental results suggest (as well as extant ones for auctions without
communication), subjects do not seem to focus on weakly dominant actions.
Suppose now that agents can communicate freely prior to bidding and exchange (si-
multaneously) non-negative transfers after bidding and learning the identity of the object’s
winner. Formally, the game played is a first- or second-price auction followed by a transfer
stage in which agents can simultaneously pick a non-negative number to transfer to the
other bidder. Their ultimate payoff is then their payoff in the auction plus the net transfers
they have received (the transfers the other bidder passed minus the transfers they had
passed to the other bidder). The availability of such ex-post transfers has no impact on the
behavior in the preceding communication and auction phases corresponding to equilibria.
Indeed, optimality required by best responses would imply zero transfers in any equilibrium
and a profile of behavior consistent with some equilibrium in the cheap-talk extension of
our baseline auction before that. Let Γ˜k denote the set of equilibrium outcomes correspond-
ing to the k-price auction with communication and transfers, k = 1, 2. That is, these are
mappings from value profiles to distributions over winning probabilities and prices when
both communication and transfers are available. We then have the following:
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Proposition 2. In any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the first- or second-price auctions
with communication and transfers, no positive transfers are passed. Therefore, the sets of
equilibrium outcomes coincide with those of the first- or second-price auctions with com-
munication. That is, Γ˜1 = Γ1 ( Γ˜2 = Γ2.
To summarize, there are three insights that are relevant to our design. First, without
communication, both auction formats entail unique equilibrium predictions when bidders
use weakly dominant strategies, and these equilibria are symmetric; The second-price auc-
tion entails multiple asymmetric equilibria if the domination restriction is dropped. Sec-
ond, with communication, second-price auctions generate substantially more equilibrium
outcomes than first-price auctions (Proposition 1). In particular, full collusion, associated
with 0 revenue, is possible under the second-price auction but not under the first-price
auction. Last, transfers have no impact on outcomes in either auction format and out-
comes are predicted to be identical to those in auctions with communication, but without
transfers. Furthermore, no positive transfers are passed in any subgame-perfect equilibrium
(Proposition 2).3
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